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Abstract: This paper uses quantile regression and counterfactual decomposition methods 
to investigate whether a ‘glass ceiling’ exists or if instead a ‘sticky floor’ is more prevalent 
among the African populace in the South African ‘formal’ labour market. Furthermore, it 
assesses whether the incidence of gender wage ‘discrimination’ has been widening or 
narrowing across the entire wage distribution from 1995-2004. Given that it is almost ten 
years after the abolition of legalised discrimination and the introduction of affirmative 
action legislation, one would have expected that the gaps between male and female wages 
in general and in particular, the component of these gaps attributable to different returns 
to characteristics ‘discrimination’ might have decreased. Surprisingly, the results of this 
study suggest that the gaps increased between 1995 and 2004. In addition, there is evidence 
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I) Introduction 
For a long time, African women were subjected to both legalised and informal social 
discrimination which has hampered their full integration in the South African labour 
market. Hence the post-Apartheid regime has since 1994, implemented fundamental 
constitutional changes to ensure fair access and treatment of women in the labour market. 
For example, there is the Employment Equity Act (1998) which abolishes discrimination 
in the work place (Maziya, 2001). With these enabling policies one would expect to see a 
decline in labour market inequalities which is matched with progressive changes in the 
place of African women in the job market. Indeed, analyses of micro-data collected from 
the mid-1990s onwards attest to an improved assimilation of women in the labour market. 
However, this is associated with persistent inequity among the workforce. For instance, 
women still earn significantly less than men, see Figure 1.1. Despite the abolition of 
legalised discrimination and the introduction of Affirmative Action legislation, there is still 
wide acknowledgement that a significant portion of these wage differentials is due to 
gender discrimination. Quite worryingly, the latter has received less attention in the 
literature than it deserves as it has always stood on the shadow of institutionalised racism 
(Isemonger and Roberts, 1999).   
To be explicit, the few studies which were devoted to gender “discrimination” and 
especially its wage aspect include Casale (1998), Isemonger and Roberts (1999), Winter 
(1999), Hinks (2002), Rospabe (2001a) and Gruen (2004) inter alia. These studies have 
exclusively investigated the gender pay gaps at the conditional mean of the wage 
distributions. As a result, they have neglected the distributional implications of 
standardising the size of the wage gaps across the entire wage distribution. This caveat 
creates a huge potential for studies which seek to understand the South African gender 
wage gap conundrum by carrying out distributional analyses. 
Also, to this point, there is still a dearth of information on whether the incidence of gender 
wage “discrimination” increased or decreased over time. This is because existing works 
have utilised different analytical methods making comparative analyses of their results 
fraught with difficulties (although their scope spreads over the period from 1994 to 2004). 
Even so, most of these studies have suggested the presence of “discrimination” for a 
maximum period of one year. Hence, they have not provided us with any systematic 
analysis of whether “discrimination” is increasing or decreasing. Obviously, this limited 
focus fails to reveal long term trends of the gender wage gaps. Generally, such trends are 
important in assessing the effectiveness of counter legislation.  
In light of the limitations in the existing works, this paper aims to contribute to the debate 
by applying quantile regression and counterfactual decomposition methods adjusted for 
the quantile regression framework to investigate whether a ‘glass ceiling2’ exists or if 
instead a “sticky floor”3  is more prevalent among the African populace in the South 
African “formal” labour market. In addition, we aim to assess whether the incidence of 
                                                 
2 Glass ceiling is a situation where the gender gaps are typically wider at the top of the wage distribution. 
3 A Sticky floor is a situation whereby the gender gaps are wider at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
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gender wage “discrimination”4  has been increasing or decreasing across the entire wage 
distribution from 1995-2004. By addressing these issues, this research helps in taking stock 
of the achievements made in gender mainstreaming after 10 years of South Africa’s 
democratic independence.  In carrying out such an audit, it is critical that all decisions are 
underpinned by sound research that systematically explores the prevalence of labour 
market discrimination. This is critical because the existence of labour market 
discrimination inevitably negates any endeavours to close gender disparities regarding 
participation in economic activities. 
Ten years after the abolition of legalised discrimination and the introduction of affirmative 
action legislation, one would have expected that the gaps between male and female wages 
might have decreased5. However, we will show that on the contrary, they seem to be 
rising from 1995-2004. It will also be revealed that the South African gender wage gap is 
wider at the bottom percentiles of the wage distribution “sticky floor” than at the top.  
Turning to the organisation of this study, section two reviews some empirical literature 
which employed the quantile regression approach. Thereafter, section three poses the 
human capital earnings functions and the specification of the empirical wage model while 
section four expounds on the methodology and data analyses. Section five presents the 
results of the study while the conclusions and policy recommendations are dealt with in 
section six.  
II) Quantile Regression and the Gender Wage Gap: A brief review  
Generally, Buchinsky (1994, 1995 and 1998) instigated the application of quantile 
regression in the context of wage estimation and returns to education. Although, his 
focus was on wage disparities among women, his work has been influential to studies on 
gender wage disparities, especially the sample selection correction procedure6. 
Following Buchinsky’s seminal work, a small but growing literature has adopted this 
methodology. For example, Albrecht et al (2004) used quantile regression decomposition 
methods based on Machado and Mata (2001 2005) (MM) 7 to analyse the gender pay gap 
the Netherlands. The outcomes from the decompositions revealed that the majority of 
the gender wage gap was due to differences between returns to labour market attributes 
                                                 
4 Sex wage discrimination is defined as a situation whereby persons who are equally productive in a physical or material 
sense, receive different wages solely because of their gender. (Altonji and Blank, 1999:3168). Discrimination here is in 
quotes because it is difficult to get its exact measure due to difficulties faced in disentangling the effects of omitted 
variables like intrinsic characteristics from the unexplained component of the wage gap which is attributable to 
discrimination. 
5 Following Oaxaca and Blinder (1973) economists decompose the gender pay gap into two components which include 
rewards to different levels of human capital endowments and the unexplained element which is usually described as 
discrimination. 
6 The method entails estimating a labour force participation model and obtaining an index of labour force participation, 
which is transformed into several power series expansions. The power series expansions are then included in the wage 
equation as controls for selection bias. This formulation is adopted since the form of selection bias over the different 
percentiles of the wage distribution is unknown. However, there is currently little consensus regarding the most 
appropriate correction procedure for selectivity bias in quantile regression models. 
7 MM’s bootstrap procedure entails constructing a counterfactual male distribution, namely what women would have 
been paid if they were paid like men given their characteristics. The generated wage distribution will be used together 
with the actual female wage distribution, to construct the counterfactual wage gap which yields part of the raw wage gap 
explained by different rewards.  
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rather than to disparities in characteristics. This result mainly occurred in the top half of 
the distribution (strong “glass ceiling” effect).  
In contrast to the above study which pooled individuals with different levels of 
education, other studies stratified their samples by education groups. For example, de la 
Rica et al (2005) discovered that in Spain for the more educated there is a “glass ceiling” 
while for the less educated there is a “sticky floor”.  
Besides, Kee (2005) conducted a sectoral analysis of the gender pay gap in both the 
public and private sectors of the Australian labour market. The study detected a strong 
glass ceiling effect in the private sector. Another conclusion was that the gender wage gap 
accelerated across the distribution even after extensive controls, suggesting that the 
observed pay gap was a result of differences in returns to gender.  
As for the developing countries, most studies, which pursued the quantile regression 
approach, did not decompose the raw gender pay gap along the wage distribution. 
Instead, they estimated pooled quantile regressions and assessed the evolution of a 
gender dummy along the wage distribution. This approach may lead such studies to 
detect the gender wage premia but under identify its source. Typical studies include 
Hyder and Reilly (2005) and Ajward and Kurukulasuriya (2002) who investigated 
Pakistani and Sri Lankan cases respectively. Specifically, the latter investigated ethnic and 
gender wage disparities in Sri Lanka’s formal sector using the Sri Lanka Integrated Survey 
(1999-2000). They discovered that the premium paid to male workers in the labour force 
was more pronounced at the top of the wage distribution. 
In a recent development, Gunawardena (2006) addressed the above limitation by applying 
quantile regression estimation and decomposition methods to explore gender wage gaps 
in Sri Lanka. More importantly, the study’s findings contradict those reported in Ajward 
and Kurukulasuriya (2002). In particular, a sticky floor was detected in both the public 
and private sectors. However, there were no controls for sectoral selection bias which 
limits this work.  
In the African context, Nielsen and Rosholm (2001) used quantile regression to investigate 
sectoral wage gaps in Zambia. In so doing, the study scrutinised the raw gender pay gap 
and concluded that between 1991 and 1993 the gender pay gap in the private sector was 
lower at the bottom of the distribution, but in 1996 it was similar across all quantiles. As in 
the Sri Lankan (2002) and Pakistan cases, the Zambia study did not conduct a 
decomposition analysis of the wage gap. As a result, the factors that drive the gender pay 
gaps in the three studies remained unknown. All the same, none of the South African 
studies carried out on this topic has made recourse to quantile regression techniques (see 
e.g.Casale (1998), Isemonger and Roberts (1999), Winter (1999), Hinks (2002), Rospabe 
(2001) and Gruen (2004)).  Overall, we conclude that the application of quantile regression 
in the context of gender wage gaps in developing countries is still in its infancy. Hence, by 
utilising these new approaches, this study will not only make a significant methodological 
contribution but will also help in the formulation of target oriented labour market policy 
and intervention mechanisms8. This latter is possible as the quantile regression 
decomposition methods provide different coefficients of gender wage “discrimination” for 
the distinct percentiles of the conditional wage distribution. 
                                                 
8 The latter occurs by providing different coefficients of gender wage “discrimination” for the distinct 
percentiles of the conditional wage distribution. 
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III) Earnings Functions 
The earnings functions utilised in the study are an extension of the ‘standard’ Mincerian 
(1974) income function. A detailed derivation of the latter is given e.g. in Cahuc and 




3210ln ρρρρ                                                               (i) 
Equation (i) expresses an individual’s log hourly income (lnyi) as a function of his/her 
measured human capital stock which depends on years of education (s), years of 
experience (x) and its square (X2). Notionally, earnings should increase with the 
accumulation of human capital as it enhances productivity, that is, 1ρ  and 2ρ  are > 0. The 
square of the years of experience captures the non-linear effect of experience, as it often 
follows a parabolic shape which peaks somewhere in midlife, thus 3ρ  is < 0. This study 
extends the Mincerian wage model to include other controls often included in analyses of 
gender pay gaps in South Africa. The variables are defined according to data availability 
and they can be categorised into controls for human capital (education, experience and 
hours worked), individual characteristics (marital status, having young children), 
geographical location (provinces) sector of employment, trade union membership, 
occupation, industry of employment and controls for sample selection bias9. Controlling 
for selection bias entails estimating employment models which are modelled as follows.  
Modelling Employment 
The process of selection into employment is often modelled as a binary choice model 
where individuals are confronted with the ‘choice’ of being employed or remaining 
unemployed. The assumption underlying such an approach is that all unemployment is 
voluntary (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 2001b: 113; Chamberlain and van der Berg, 2002), 
which is clearly not the case in South Africa (Kingdon and Knight, 2000). As a result, it is 
not appropriate to model selection into employment in this manner (Bhorat and 
Leibbrandt, 2001b). Instead, an individual can choose to participate in the labour market 
but, the individual’s choice to participate does not guarantee employment. Thus, there is 
selection into employment. This means that controlling for sample selection bias involves 
estimating the earnings functions in three sequential phases; predicting participation, 
employment and eventual earnings separately by gender. Accordingly, we specify the log 
odds that an individual will participate in the labour market as a function of age, age-
squared, education, presence of children aged below 15 years in the household, provinces, 
non-labour income, marital status and urban residence. In contrast to the labour force 
participation models, household formation variables, to be exact, household size and the 
proportion of working age females in the household are also included in the employment 
equations10. 
                                                 
9 While we are aware of the possible endogeneity of some of the covariates, data limitations limit us in controlling for the 
problems; hence the reader should be aware of this. 
 
10 These models are estimated based on the broad definition of labour force participation. 
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IV) Methodology 
This section presents the study’s estimation framework which consists of two stages. The 
first stage involves estimating separate human capital earnings functions for men and 
women at different percentiles of the wage distributions using quantile regression, 
(accounting for female sample selection bias). The process of controling for selection bias 
entails firstly, estimating probit models of women’s labour force participation decision. 
This enables us to compute sample selection correction terms (λs) which control for 
selection into employment. Secondly, we fit employment probits on the sample of female 
participants, controlling for selectivity. We also compute (λs) from the employment 
process and these are eventually included in the wage models. The second stage involves 
using quantile regression decomposition methods to analyse the size and components of 
the gender wage gaps over the entire conditional wage distribution. The aforesaid 
estimation techniques are described below.  
A. Quantile Regression (QR) 
Following Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Buchinsky (1998), the model of QR in a (log) 
wage-equation setting can be described as follows. Let (wi, xi) be a random sample, where 
wi denotes the (logged) monthly gross wage of an individual i and xi is a vector K ×1 of 
regressors, and let Qθ(wi|xi) be θth-order quantile of the conditional distribution of wi given 
xi. Then, under the assumption of a linear specification, the model can be defined as 
θiθ
'
i uβ x lnwi +=                                     ( ) θβxlnx|wQ 'iiθ '
i
=                                (ii) 
where the distribution of the error term uθi, Fuθ(·), is left unspecified, just assuming that uθi 
satisfies Qθ(uθi|xi) = 0. Unlike in least squares where the parameter estimates minimise the 
sum of squared errors, in quantile regression the estimation procedure is to minimise the 
absolute sum of the errors from a particular quantile of the log earnings across workers. 
























                                    (iii) 
The solution to equation (iii) is obtained by linear programming algorithms. To avoid 
understating the standard errors (since they are heteroscedastic), they are estimated by 
bootstrap methods11 (Efron, 1979; Buchinsky, 1994; Deaton, 1997). The estimated vector 
of QR coefficients ( θβ ) is interpreted as the marginal change in the conditional quantile θ 
due to a marginal change in the corresponding element of the vector of coefficients on wi.  
B. Counterfactual Wage Decomposition  
                                                 
11 With 200 replications and accounting for clustering. 
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The study follows Albrecht et al’s (2003) adoption of the Machado and Mata (MM)’s (2000 
2005) bootstrap method which generalizes the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) criterion to 
implement the decomposition directly at each quantile. (see Kee, 2005; de la Rica et al, 
2005; Albrecht et al, 2004). The steps in (MM)’s procedure can be summarized as follows. 
• Using a standard uniform distribution, sample a quantile say the θth quantile. 
• With the male database, estimate the coefficient vectors mθβ  at the θ
th quantile. 
• From the female database take a draw from women’s data (xf), and construct a 
predicted wage by multiplying the chosen xf by the estimate of mθβ . Repeat steps one, 
two and three N times (e.g. N=5000) and construct a counterfactual male 
distribution, namely what women would have earned if they were “paid like men”. 










θ )xβ(β − . 
Data  
The data utilised for the study are obtained from the September (2004) Labour Force 
Survey (LFS_2) and the (1995, 1999) October Household Surveys (OHS) carried out by 
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). The OHS are annual surveys. These surveys are 
independent cross sections specifically, for each of them different samples were drawn 
from the population. A large but varying number of households across all provinces of 
South Africa were sampled allowing a detailed snapshot of labour market conditions and 
outcomes. For the years 1995 and 1999 in particular, similar sample designs have been 
applied. 3 000 Enumeration Areas (EAs) were sampled and 10 households within each of 
them have been interviewed, resulting in a sample size of 30 000 households. The total 
sample of labour force participants comprises of individuals aged between 15 and 65 and 
either reported to be employed or were categorised as unemployed using the broad 
definition13.  
On the other hand, the LFS_2 is a bi-annual rotating panel household survey. The rotating 
panel methodology is specifically designed to measure the dynamics of employment and 
unemployment in the country. The LFS_2 captured information about the labour market 
situation of approximately 68 000 adults of working age (15-65 years) living in over 30 000 
households across the country. Both the OHS, and the LFS_2 have sampling weights and 
they were considered in the analyses. However, a drawback of both the OHS and the 
LFS_2 is that the wage information is given in the form of either points or intervals. This 
                                                 
12 Difference between the female log wage density at various percentiles and the counterfactual density.In line with most 
of the literature, we chose to evaluate differences in observed characteristics 
at the men ´s returns, under the assumption that their market rewards wages are not distorted by discrimination. A 
positive sign on the gap implies that returns to men’s characteristics are higher than the returns to women’s 
characteristics. 
13 Includes people who although not actively looking for a job would nevertheless like to work. 
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compromises our analyses as it necessitates employing an indirect method to obtain a wage 
series compatible with quantile regressions14.  
Data Analysis 
Firstly, we dwell on the sample delineation process before describing the variables used in 
this study. Accordingly, the selected sub-sample comprises of working age Africans (15-65 
years) employed in the “formal’ sector, provided they availed their wage information. 
Noteworthy is the fact that our definition of the ‘formal’ sector encompasses the formal 
and domestic sectors, the latter is included as it employs most African women. Ultimately, 
the data cleaning exercise engendered the weighted sample statistics presented in Figure 
1.2. The available information tallies with the economy’s labour force participation rates 
since the numbers of employed males constantly outnumber those of women from 1995-
2004. The figure also shows that the total sample of African employees who availed their 
wage information decreased by 7 percent between 1995 and 2004. Quite worryingly, the 
statistics suggest a wholesale collapse of employment between 1995 and 1999, which is 
clearly not the case. Probably, the smaller sample sizes for 1999 are due to a sample 
composition shift or it could be that odd things which we cannot explain happened that 
year. Nonetheless, the statistics accord with the feminisation of the labour market. While, 
the sub sample of employed women increased by about 4 percent from 1995-2004 that for 
men decreased by 13 percent.  
Secondly, analyses of empirical wage density functions for the years 1995, 1999 and 2004 
were out carried by gender. Incidentally, log real gross monthly wages are used in this 
study. These real wage series’ were obtained from deflating  nominal monthly wages for 
the years 1995, 1999 and 2004 to the 1995 base (expressed in 2000 prices) using the South 
African Reserve Bank’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) series (KBP7031J). The density 
functions were approximated using an Epanechnikov kernel estimator (see Johnston and 
DiNardo, 1997: 370-375; StataCorp, 2003). Figure 2 shows the resulting density plots. 
The three panels in Figure 2 indicate that male and female wage distributions are clearly 
distinct. In tandem with this, the female wage distributions mainly lie to the left of the 
male wage distributions, especially at the lower percentiles of the distributions. Also, the 
latter are characterised by a higher density function around the mode and a relatively lower 
dispersion. It is also apparent that the advantage that the males enjoy over females at the 
lower quantiles of the distributions is significantly reduced at the upper quantiles. Thus, if 
one considers only the raw wage distributions, it appears there is a “sticky floor” and no 
“glass ceiling” for African women.  
Thereafter, a summary of both the dependent and independent variables used by year and 
gender is provided. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  
Considering the dependent variable, the statistics demonstrate that men’s earnings are on 
average higher than women’s. The disadvantaged position of women is further highlighted 
by a 3% decline in their real wages between 1995 and 1999.  In contrast, those of men 
increased by close to 6% in the same period. Despite these differences, both sexes 
experienced an increase in their incomes between 1995 and 2004. In particular, the wages 
for men and women concomitantly increased by 12% and 7% respectively.  
                                                 
14 The derivation of the wage series’ followed ideas discussed in Berger and Yu (2006). 
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Turning to the covariates, the displayed information conveys some traits of patriarchy in 
trade union membership. Probably this is due to the relatively higher concentration of 
women in non-unionised sectors such as the social services (includes domestic workers). 
Consequently, men’s relatively higher wages are partly attributable to the union wage 
premia.  
Furthermore, the data reveals that the distribution of participants among the provinces (by 
gender) does not significantly differ across the data sets. Perhaps, this implies that the data 
sets are comparable.  
In the case of education, the statistics exhibit that there is a slightly higher proportion of 
male participants who attained primary level and below than women. Interestingly, both 
sexes have a higher proportion of participants who attained secondary school than the 
other levels. In this vein, for both sexes, the ratio of secondary school graduates increased 
by around 9 percent from 1995-2004. Not surprisingly, the data shows that there are 
slightly more women with diplomas and degrees than males.  
The data also portray some aspects of industrial concentration. In line with this, both 
genders are concentrated in social services, trade, manufacturing and agriculture. Despite 
these obvious similarities there are gender disparities in the proportions of participants 
across these industries. For instance, there is a relatively higher percentage of women in 
the social services for example, in 1995 the industry accommodated 61% of the female 
participants and the corresponding proportion of men was 23%. On the other hand, men 
appear to dominate women in sectors such as agriculture, mining and construction.  
Furthermore, the figures expose that there is a higher ratio of participants in elementary 
and skilled occupational categories irrespective of sex. It is also evident that there is gender 
based occupational concentration. In this case, there are more male artisans and operators 
than women. Inversely, women outnumber men in occupations like technicians and clerks.  
Lastly, the information given for marriage and fertility harmonises with the stylised facts as 
both variables are generally declining with time. Subsequent to this data description 
process, we proceed to analyse the study’s estimation results. 
V) Estimation results 
The outcomes of the quantile regression equations reported at the 10th, 25th, 50th,75th and 
90th percentiles of the wage distributions form the starting point for discussion in this 
section15. The results are presented in Tables 2a (for 1995), 2b (for 1999) and 2c (for 2004). 
For these regressions the omitted (base) variables correspond to an unmarried, non-
unionised worker with elementary education, residing in Gauteng province, employed as 
an operator in the manufacturing industry. The distinct wage models are analysed together 
and their coefficients provide an indication of whether or not the returns to observable 
characteristics differ by gender and how these differences change as we move across the 
wage distributions.  
The following findings stand out. The coefficients on age/experience for men are always 
significant. This means having more experience increases wages up to a certain point of 
the life cycle but after this peak, an additional year of experience decreases earnings. This 
                                                 
15 Despite being necessary, the discussion of participation and employment models has been omitted in 
this essay. However, the outcomes are available on request. 
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effect slightly decreases as we move up the quantiles of the wage distributions. In contrast 
to the male equations, these variables do not always feature significantly in the female 
regressions, although most of the cases conform to the theoretical predictions. Probably, 
this irregularity in women’s returns to the variable in question is due to family related 
career interruptions.  
We also discover that earnings increase with the number of hours worked (if significant). 
Despite this commonality, some sex disparities in the effects of the variables are perceived. 
Accordingly, the discrepancies are skewed in favour of women since the coefficients are 
generally higher in the female regressions. All the same, the returns are higher at the 
bottom than at the top of the wage distributions.  
Besides, being married (proxy for factors such as stability, discipline and motivation) 
confers some relatively higher returns for men than women. The advantages conferred to 
workers by this status indicate that it acts as a motivational/productivity signal to 
employers. Incidentally, the sizes of the 2004 coefficients increase with the percentiles of 
both sexes’ wage distributions, whereas the pattern is not as obvious for females. 
Conversely, the outcomes for 1999 and 2004 portray that the returns are lower at the 
upper tails of the male wage distribution, while they are mostly insignificant in the case of 
females. Interestingly, the findings for 1995 diverge from the above as marriage lowers 
women’s returns. Most likely, the relatively higher fertility rates observed in 1995 made 
marriage serve as a signal of potential career interruptions to the employers who may have 
discriminated against married women.  
Quite fundamentally, the study establishes that educational attainment yields higher returns 
as compared to the base level (elementary). The returns tend to increase with the education 
levels. This upshot contradicts the law of diminishing returns to the formation of human 
capital. Another observation is that there are gender gaps in these returns. Accordingly, the 
period from 1995-2004 is distinguished by women who enjoy higher returns at the 
secondary school echelon and below than men. The gender gap in returns to secondary 
education declines as we approach the top end of the wage distributions. Also, in contrast 
to the case for secondary school, men have higher coefficients for degrees than women, 
except in 1999. Nevertheless, the gender gap in returns to a degree fluctuates along the 
wage distributions.  
In likeness with inter alia Butcher and Rouse (2001) and Mwabu and Schultz (1998) union 
members are found to earn significantly more than non-union members. This outcome 
highlights the strong bargaining power of South African unions. The union wage premia 
are higher at the bottom of both male and female wage distributions, except for women in 
1999 where the picture is not obvious. The lower returns in the upper quantiles are 
explainable by the consideration that most wages in the upper market are set by direct 
contracts as compared to collective bargaining (Bhorat et al, 2002). Apparently, some 
gender disparities in favour of women are evident in the premia. At most the gender gaps 
tend to increase with the quantiles of the wage distributions.  
Furthermore, the outcomes for the industrial sectors showcase that few industries 
significantly offer higher wages than the manufacturing sector. Overall, this is exemplified 
by the transport and electricity industrial sectors. Alternatively, industries such as 
agriculture and trade pay less than manufacturing. Nonetheless, the progression of the 
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returns along the wage distributions differs by sector and time period. For example, in 
2004 there is a decline in men’s mining coefficients as we approach the upper tails of the 
wage distributions, whilst the opposite applies to transport.  All the same, gender gaps in 
industrial returns are difficult to analyse due to perceived inconsistencies in the significance 
of the variables. 
Additionally, the outcomes for the occupational dummies display a wage hierarchy relative 
to the base category (operator). Accordingly, managers, professionals, technicians and 
clerks earn significantly more than operators, whereas the opposite applies to employees of 
the agriculture sector and those in elementary occupations. It is also highlighted that 
women in higher paying jobs (relative to operators) get larger rewards than men. In most 
cases, the gender differential in returns to the variable of interest increase with the 
percentiles of the wage distribution16.  
It is also understood that the estimates for the provincial variables are lower for workers 
located in any other province than Gauteng. Generally, the magnitudes of the provincial 
dummies are larger for females implying that women are more likely to earn less compared 
to men. In principal, the gender disparities in the returns increase with the quantiles of the 
wage distributions.  
Lastly, the female selection bias correction terms featured to be insignificant in most cases. 
Nevertheless, this finding is not unique as it tallies with that of Winter (1999). Probably, it 
indicates that selection bias does not generally bind in the formal sector which is the 
domain of both studies.  
In sum, the evidence presented so far points out that returns to observable characteristics 
differ by gender and that these differences change as we move throughout the distribution. 
Therefore, the next step is to investigate the sources of the gender gap.  
Table 3 presents the raw/observed and the counterfactual gender wage gaps for 1995, 
1999 and 2004. The raw wage gaps are defined as the difference between male and female 
unconditional log wages at the different quantiles of the wage distributions (Albrecht et al, 
2004). The counterfactual gap shows the disparities between the quantiles of women’s log 
wage distributions and the corresponding quantiles of a counterfactual distribution that 
arises if women maintained their characteristics but were paid like men.17 
Firstly, we explore the raw gender wage gaps. Table 3 exhibits a monotonically declining 
gap as we move towards the upper quantiles of the 1995 wage distribution. However, this 
pattern is not robust across the time periods. For instance, the 1999 gap increases 
dramatically from the 10th to the 25th percentile and declines thereafter. Typically, the 
evolution of the 1999 gap identifies females whose wages lie in the 25th percentile as the 
most disadvantaged18. Besides, Table 3 displays a gender gap that is generally decreasing as 
we approach the upper tails of the 2004 wage distribution although the evolution of the 
gap from the 10th to the 50th percentiles is relatively flat. This tendency for a deceleration 
                                                 
16 The fact that women have larger coefficients than men in some of the occupations (relative to the reference group of 
operators) does not imply that they get a higher wage since they may have a lower wage in the reference category. A 
similar comment pertains to the coefficients on the rest of the dummy variables. 
17 We are unable to compute standard errors for the decomposition due to low computational power as we are using a 
large sample size. 
18 Probably, the sharp increase from the 10th to the 25th percentiles of the 1999 wage distribution is due to a selection 
effect as the 1999 sample suggested a wholesale collapse of employment which is clearly not the case when the overall 
sample of workers is considered. 
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of the gap as we move up the quantiles of the wage distributions possibly indicates a 
“sticky floor”. Hence, by focussing only on the mean raw gender wage gap, substantial 
variations of the gap will be hidden.  
Secondly, we investigate the counterfactual wage gaps. A striking feature of these gaps is 
that they are positive across the data sets. This positive gap implies that men’s returns are 
greater than women’s. Thus, even if women had the same distribution of characteristics as 
men, they would still receive lower pay across the wage distribution. The percentage 
contribution of the counterfactual wage gaps to the raw wage gaps are also presented in 
Table 3. A percentage value greater than 100 potentially means that women have 
characteristics that compensate them for any unobservables which may include 
“discrimination”. In other words, it implies that women have better characteristics than 
men. However, the very large percentage values found for instance, in the upper quantiles 
of the 2004 wage distribution merit comment. Possibly, they emerged because the raw 
wage gap is relatively small. 
More importantly, Table 3 shows that the counterfactual wage gap for 1995 decreases 
from the bottom to the upper tails of the conditional wage distributions. In addition, it 
exhibits that the 1999 gap strictly declines monotonically from the 25th percentile towards 
the upper quantiles of the wage distribution. Lastly, Table 3 reveals that the 2004 gap is 
somewhat flat from the bottom to the middle of the distribution and declines thereafter. In 
sum, the evidence presented so far unequivocally supports the existence of a “sticky floor” 
in the “formal’ sector of the South African labour market. Thus, low income females are 
more likely to be disadvantaged, although it is not clear whether the disadvantage is mainly 
due to “discrimination” or to other unobserved heterogeneity that the model does not 
control for. 
Finally, we probe into the issue of whether the component of the raw gender wage gap 
attributable to different returns has been increasing or decreasing along the wage 
distribution over the period 1995-2004. In this case, it is perceptible that the portion of the 
wage distribution that ranges from the 10th to the 25th percentiles experienced a decline in 
the returns component of the gap over the period in question (although the case for 1999 
merits comment). The decline observed at the bottom tails of the wage distributions could 
be due to the strengthening of minimum wage policies with time. All the same, the effect 
of different pay structures on gender wage differentials is still substantial despite the 
observed decline. On the other hand, the 50th and 75th percentiles saw an increase in the 
component from 1995-2004. So, we conclude that highly paid women are facing more and 
more gender based wage inequalities with time.  
VI) Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
This paper explored gender wage gaps throughout the wage distribution for African 
“formal” sector employees in South Africa over the period 1995-2004. The analyses 
utilised individual data from the 1995 and 1999 October Household Surveys and the 2004 
September Labour Force Survey. Quantile regression techniques were used to control for 
various characteristics at different points of the wage distributions. In addition, the 
Machado Mata (2005) decomposition method was utilised to estimate the component of 
the wage gaps not explained by different characteristics (counterfactual gap). 
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Basing on this methodology, our findings on unconditional wage gaps indicate that the 
mean gender wage gap conceals some variations in the gap across the wage distribution. In 
fact, the magnitudes of these gaps slide as we approach the upper tails of the wage 
distributions. Analogously, the absolute sizes of the counterfactual wage gaps generally 
decline as we proceed from the bottom to the upper tails of the wage distributions. As it is, 
both the raw and counterfactual gaps align us towards an existence of a “sticky floor” in 
the South African labour Market.  
Additionally, the study revealed that the counterfactual wage gaps did not generally show a 
declining tendency along the whole wage distribution between 1995 and 2004. Instead, a 
slight decline was evident only in the 10th, 25th and 90th percentiles of the wage distribution. 
If discrimination is the main factor that drove these pay gaps, then female workers in the 
upper quantiles became more disadvantaged with time, even under the existence of equal 
opportunity legislation.  
On the basis of our findings, it is suggested that if the labour market outcomes for African 
men and women are to be levelled, considerable efforts should be invested in 
strengthening the implementation of countervailing clauses on the violation of the gender 
neutral labour market institutions embedded in new the labour legislation. Quite 
significantly, it is recommended that mitigatory measures should focus more on women at 
the bottom end of the wage distribution because they are the most likely to be 
“discriminated” against. Also, the policymakers should design strategies to curb the 
widening of the wage gaps in top paying jobs. Furthermore, because discrimination and the 
subordinate role of women seem to be entrenched at various stages it is essential to get an 
understanding of the barriers that exist in the labour market and also in the greater society 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for African Employees by Gender (1995, 1999 and 2004) 
  1995 1999 2004 














Real Monthly income 1200 27.4 1487 28.39 1164 51.04 1574 50.02 1284 48.2 1667 47.9 
Demographic Variables                       
Children <15years 0.755 0.009 0.621 0.012 0.678 0.008 0.51 0.008 0.681 0.009 0.487 0.011 
Children < 6years 0.452 0.01 0.385 0.01 0.433 0.009 0.35 0.007 0.418 0.009 0.335 0.009 
Married         0.453 0.01 0.595 0.007 0.392 0.01 0.54 0.009 0.32 0.009 0.45 0.011 
Human Capital  
Age 37.33 0.165 37.52 0.16 37.2 0.19 36.9 0.144 38.2 0.21 37.1 0.21 
Age-Squared      1493 12.8 1516 10.5 1484 14.9 1461 11.2 1565 16.5 1486 17.23 
Log hours 3.68 0.007 3.76 0.005 3.75 0.007 3.83 0.005 3.7 0.08 3.83 0.005 
None 0.078 0.005 0.118 0.005 0.06 0.004 0.09 0.005 0.074 0.004 0.065 0.004 
Elementary 0.04 0.003 0.048 0.003 0.024 0.003 0.03 0.003 0.015 0.002 0.019 0.003 
Primary        0.24 0.008 0.263 0.007 0.27 0.008 0.28 0.007 0.2 0.008 0.226 0.007 
Secondary      0.45 0.011 0.479 0.009 0.45 0.01 0.49 0.008 0.538 0.002 0.57 0.009 
College - - - - 0.026 0.003 0.01 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.014 0.002 
Diploma     0.11 0.008 0.061 0.005 0.09 0.004 0.05 0.003 0.114 0.006 0.067 0.004 
Degree         0.027 0.004 0.023 0.003 0.04 0.005 0.03 0.003 0.053 0.006 0.038 0.004 
Occupations                         
Manager 0.006 0.001 0.019 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.03 0.003 0.016 0.002 0.032 0.004 
Professional 0.026 0.003 0.018 0.002 0.040 0.005 0.33 0.002 0.039 0.005 0.026 0.003 
Technician 0.16 0.009 0.066 0.004 0.124 0.008 0.07 0.003 0.12 0.006 0.063 0.004 
Clerk 0.11 0.007 0.071 0.004 0.100 0.006 0.07 0.004 0.123 0.007 0.059 0.004 
Skilled  0.12 0.006 0.117 0.005 0.086 0.005 0.13 0.006 0.104 0.006 0.157 0.007 
Agriculturalist  0.002 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.010 0.003 0.03 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.001 
Artisan  0.024 0.003 0.133 0.005 0.040 0.005 0.18 0.006 0.035 0.004 0.18 0.008 
Operator 0.05 0.005 0.211 0.005 0.035 0.005 0.23 0.007 0.04 0.004 0.178 0.007 
Elementary 0.52 0.011 0.361 0.01 0.550 0.008 0.22 0.007 0.513 0.011 0.26 0.009 
Industries 
Agriculture 0.08 0.009 0.211 0.011 0.084 0.084 0.13 0.008 0.049 0.004 0.095 0.006 
Mining   0.005 0.002 0.094 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.14 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.106 0.012 
Manufacturing 0.11 0.009 0.165 0.009 0.096 0.008 0.17 0.007 0.112 0.006 0.174 0.007 
Electricity 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.02 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.013 0.002 
Construction 0.005 0.001 0.063 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.06 0.005 0.013 0.002 0.097 0.007 
Trade  0.16 0.008 0.124 0.005 0.14 0.007 0.13 0.006 0.16 0.008 0.156 0.007 
Transport 0.01 0.002 0.063 0.004 0.01 0.001 0.06 0.004 0.02 0.003 0.061 0.004 
Finance 0.03 0.003 0.039 0.003 0.049 0.006 0.07 0.004 0.05 0.004 0.107 0.006 
Social Services 0.61 0.013 0.232 0.012 0.598 0.01 0.21 0.008 0.59 0.01 0.195 0.008 
Provinces 
Western Cape  0.03 0.005 0.045 0.006 0.050 0.006 0.06 0.006 0.054 0.005 0.049 0.005 
Eastern Cape  0.146 0.008 0.095 0.004 0.120 0.009 0.07 0.006 0.12 0.006 0.081 0.006 
Northern Cape  0.007 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.009 0.017 0.002 
Free State  0.103 0.005 0.099 0.004 0.098 0.008 0.11 0.008 0.078 0.003 0.182 0.008 
Kwazulu/Natal 0.215 0.011 0.185 0.008 0.200 0.014 0.16 0.01 0.223 0.01 0.181 0.013 
North West  0.091 0.008 0.111 0.006 0.095 0.007 0.12 0.008 0.085 0.005 0.098 0.008 
Gauteng  0.242 0.014 0.282 0.012 0.245 0.011 0.3 0.005 0.26 0.009 0.305 0.011 
Mpumalanga  0.068 0.006 0.093 0.004 0.077 0.007 0.09 0.007 0.076 0.004 0.086 0.006 
Northern Province  0.098 0.007 0.077 0.004 0.096 0.007 0.08 0.005 0.097 0.001 0.095 0.009 
Trade Unionism 0.26 0.011 0.38 0.012 0.32 0.009 0.48 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.382 0.012 















Table 2a: Quantile Regressions for African Men and Women’s Log Real Wages (1995) 
 Males Females 
Quantile θ  =10 θ  =25 θ  =50 θ  =75 θ  =90 θ  =10 θ  =25 θ  =50 θ  =75 θ  =90 
Age 0.052* 0.038* 0.034* 0.026* 0.030* 0.029** 0.016 0.019** 0.024** 0.027** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age-Squared -0.001* -0.0004* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0035* -0.0013* -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log hours 0.112** 0.041 0.005 0.013 -0.003 0.202* 0.136* 0.064*** 0.030 -0.044 
 (0.052) (0.033) (0.028) (0.029) (0.037) (0.047) (0.041) (0.034) (0.032) (0.037) 
Married 0.212* 0.170* 0.132* 0.122* 0.151* -0.106* -0.114* -0.051** -0.054** -0.002 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.033) (0.028) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) 
Education Levels 
Primary 0.137* 0.100* 0.063* 0.072* 0.008 0.1758* 0.200* 0.109** 0.064*** 0.044 
 (0.036) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.056) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) 
Secondary 0.358* 0.299* 0.245* 0.263* 0.207* 0.580* 0.543* 0.403* 0.310* 0.278* 
 (0.043) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) (0.059) (0.047) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041) 
Diploma 0.669* 0.546* 0.465* 0.518* 0.498* 0.716* 0.727* 0.493* 0.437* 0.407* 
 (0.088) (0.050) (0.050) (0.043) (0.055) (0.102) (0.085) (0.066) (0.070) (0.081) 
Degree 1.152* 0.999* 0.906* 0.922* 0.842* 0.900* 0.943* 0.742* 0.640* 0.644* 
 (0.116) (0.096) (0.104) (0.095) (0.126) (0.177) (0.126) (0.108) (0.136) (0.130) 
Occupations 
Manager 0.375* 0.389* 0.527* 0.648* 0.844* 0.841** 0.693* 0.845* 1.007* 0.818* 
 (0.118) (0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.131 (0.329) (0.137) (0.212) (0.182) (0.126) 
Professional 0.300* 0.306* 0.377* 0.453* 0.459* 0.827* 0.859* 0.840* 0.808* 0.584* 
 (0.113) (0.115) (0.112) (0.092) (0.096) (0.200) (0.113) (0.134) (0.128) (0.109) 
Technician 0.511* 0.476* 0.527* 0.486* 0.384* 1.000* 0.968* 0.991* 0.957* 0.697* 
 (0.090) (0.054) (0.043) (0.039) (0.048) (0.145) (0.085) (0.098) (0.081) (0.084) 
Clerk 0.101 0.211* 0.219* 0.265* 0.209* 0.389* 0.453* 0.471* 0.527* 0.336* 
 (0.071) (0.041) (0.036) (0.042) (0.061) (0.124) (0.076) (0.088) (0.077) (0.077) 
Skilled 0.014 0.014 0.133* 0.180* 0.166* 0.027 0.131*** 0.233* 0.313* 0.223** 
 (0.052) (0.038) (0.033) (0.031) (0.048) (0.130) (0.076) (0.099) (0.080) (0.090) 
Agric worker -0.403** -0.386** 0.034 0.242** 0.153 -0.206 -0.197 -0.139 0.113 -0.314 
 (0.172) (0.164) (0.169) (0.095) (0.170) (0.231) (0.261) (0.337) (0.279) (0.277) 
Artisan -0.021 -0.008 0.047*** 0.113* 0.138** -0.234 -0.152 -0.041 -0.036 -0.020 
 (0.047) (0.037) (0.026) (0.027) (0.045) (0.208) (0.127) (0.067) (0.085) (0.122) 
Elementary Jobs -0.259* -0.274* -0.191* -0.205* -0.280* -0.292** -0.295* -0.234** -0.174** -0.296* 
 (0.039) (0.031) (0.023) (0.023) (0.036) (0.123) (0.064) (0.093) (0.068) (0.077) 
Industries 
Agriculture -0.513* -0.586* -0.720* -0.716* -0.712* -0.326* -0.359* -0.430* -0.473* -0.345* 
 (0.060) (0.047) (0.046) (0.041) (0.057) (0.086) (0.067) (0.107) (0.076) (0.084) 
Mining -0.128*** -0.115** -0.079*** -0.071** -0.111** -0.105 -0.211 -0.152 0.076 0.178 
 (0.078) (0.051) (0.045) (0.036) (0.050) (0.183) (0.201) (0.283) (0.199) (0.188) 
Electricity 0.347* 0.232* 0.273* 0.169** 0.164*** 0.455 0.626* 0.280 0.045 0.102 
 (0.116) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.091) (0.308) (0.223) (0.199) (0.273) (0.199) 
Construction -0.184* -0.149* -0.205* -0.209* -0.215* 0.192 0.128 0.048 0.106 0.121 
 (0.064) (0.053) (0.044) (0.040) (0.060) (0.248) (0.278) (0.211) (0.170) (0.230) 
Trade -0.163** -0.181* -0.227* -0.219* -0.204* -0.086 -0.155** -0.152*** -0.240* -0.118** 
 (0.066) (0.043) (0.039) (0.034) (0.044) (0.078) (0.061) (0.086) (0.064) (0.058) 
Transport 0.140** 0.099** 0.018 -0.017 0.032 -0.005 0.039 0.002 0.112 0.306*** 
 (0.057) (0.047) (0.035) (0.036) (0.050) (0.162) (0.105) (0.140) (0.104) (0.160) 
Finance 0.083 0.024 -0.051 -0.045 -0.076 0.101 0.130 0.043 -0.028 0.096 
 (0.089) (0.052) (0.062) (0.058) (0.067) (0.122) (0.089) (0.101) (0.085) (0.094) 
Social Service -0.089 -0.016 -0.023 -0.040 -0.038 -0.191** -0.175** -0.171*** -0.186* -0.089 
 (0.057) (0.047) (0.040) (0.029) (0.049) (0.078) (0.059) (0.095) (0.055) (0.060) 
Unionism 0.346* 0.298* 0.204* 0.168* 0.123* 0.366* 0.331* 0.292* 0.268* 0.206* 
 (0.037) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.024) (0.044) (0.035) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) 
Provinces 
Western Cape -0.022 -0.035 -0.081 -0.131** -0.055 -0.005 -0.097 -0.192* -0.218** -0.080 
 (0.087) (0.059) (0.056) (0.059) (0.091) (0.070) (0.066) (0.054) (0.083) (0.134) 
Eastern Cape -0.377* -0.275* -0.229* -0.159* -0.087*** -0.472* -0.398* -0.368* -0.279* -0.179* 
 (0.063) (0.050) (0.044) (0.036) (0.049) (0.076) (0.050) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
Northern Cape -0.187** -0.209** -0.183** -0.238* -0.257** -0.537* -0.395** -0.367* -0.329* -0.375* 
 (0.079) (0.076) (0.070) (0.065) (0.107) (0.137) (0.150) (0.110) (0.061) (0.088) 
Free State -0.423* -0.381* -0.365* -0.372* -0.351* -1.124* -0.980* -0.848* -0.661* -0.488* 
 (0.061) (0.048) (0.037) (0.035) (0.043) (0.095) (0.070) (0.049) (0.053) (0.049) 
Kwazulu/Natal -0.141** -0.093** -0.059*** -0.027 0.023 -0.265* -0.226* -0.210* -0.158* -0.079** 
 (0.055) (0.045) (0.032) (0.034) (0.052) (0.061) (0.044) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) 
North West -0.134** -0.107** -0.147* -0.138* -0.064 -0.584* -0.440* -0.362* -0.261* -0.153* 
 (0.063) (0.052) (0.040) (0.037) (0.063) (0.076) (0.078) (0.057) (0.053) (0.042) 
Mpumalanga -0.282* -0.277* -0.193* -0.100** 0.007 -0.379* -0.361* -0.254* -0.207* -0.025 
 (0.065) (0.053) (0.048) (0.046) (0.064) (0.076) (0.057) (0.065) (0.058) (0.080) 
Northern Province -0.237* -0.099 -0.074 0.037 0.096** -0.232* -0.245* -0.107** -0.038 -0.009 
 (0.081) (0.061) (0.053) (0.042) (0.049) (0.058) (0.067) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) 
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Sample Selection Correction Terms 
Lambda1      1.103 2.069 3.427 5.556*** 0.549 
      (4.139) (3.389) (2.455) (3.078) (4.282) 
Lambda2 - - - - - -2.455 -2.851 -4.719 -7.356*** -0.637 
 - - - - - (5.608) (4.685) (3.337) (4.169) (5.816) 
Lambda3 - - - - - -0.004 -0.362 -0.408*** -0.666*** -0.175 
 - - - - - (0.368) (0.272) (0.215) (0.284) (0.372) 
Lambda4 - - - - - 0.031 0.060 0.092** 0.122** 0.050 
 - - - - - (0.060) (0.042) (0.032) (0.043) (0.063) 
Constant 4.609* 5.563* 6.174* 6.595* 6.936* 4.618* 5.092)* 5.663* 5.818* 6.737* 
 (0.268) (0.187) (0.160) (0.143) (0.207) (0.484) (0.361) (0.320) (0.335) (0.449) 
Observations 9964 9964 9964 9964 9964 6734 6734 6734 6734 6734 
Bootstrapped Standard errors (200, replications accounting for clustering) in parentheses* significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%* *; ** 

































































Table 2b: Quantile Regressions for African Men and Women’s Log Real Wages (1999) 
 Males Females  
Quantile θ  =10 θ  =25 θ  =50 θ  =75 θ  =90 θ  =10 θ  =25 θ  =50 θ  =75 θ  =90 
Age 0.076* 0.050* 0.044* 0.044* 0.062* 0.059* 0.036* 0.034* 0.035* 0.043* 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) 
Age-squared -0.001* -0.001* -0.0005* -0.0004* -0.001* -0.007* -0.0004* -0.0003* -0.0004* -0.0004* 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log Hours 0.232* 0.103** 0.058 0.064*** 0.073 0.425* 0.335* 0.286* 0.254* 0.229* 
 (0.058) (0.051) (0.036) (0.035) (0.055) (0.045) (0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.056) 
Married 0.152* 0.144* 0.125* 0.128* 0.123* -0.005 0.013 0.020 0.056*** 0.113* 
 (0.043) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026) (0.036) (0.044) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.042) 
Education Levels 
Primary 0.111*** 0.020 0.068* 0.013 -0.034 0.167** 0.139* 0.095* -0.019 0.035 
 (0.057) (0.034) (0.026) (0.033) (0.042) (0.066) (0.042) (0.036) (0.042) (0.055) 
Secondary 0.291* 0.203* 0.248* 0.240* 0.247* 0.387* 0.320* 0.324* 0.229* 0.267* 
 (0.058) (0.040) (0.030) (0.034) (0.050) (0.067) (0.042) (0.043) (0.049) (0.056) 
Diploma 0.820* 0.763* 0.716* 0.667* 0.770* 0.971* 0.912* 0.746* 0.589* 0.545* 
 (0.091) (0.084) (0.071) (0.068) (0.110) (0.112) (0.083) (0.069) (0.071) (0.102) 
Degree 0.897* 0.808* 0.832* 0.883* 0.690* 1.061* 1.013* 0.944* 0.781* 0.818* 
 (0.118) (0.090) (0.085) (0.124) (0.134) (0.204) (0.093) (0.100) (0.094) (0.161) 
Occupations 
Manager 0.445* 0.484* 0.512* 0.654* 0.857* -0.079 0.794* 0.733* 0.648* 0.565** 
 (0.141) (0.088) (0.104) (0.088) (0.186) (0.474) (0.235) (0.150) (0.159) (0.285) 
Professional 0.463* 0.349* 0.381* 0.356* 0.535* 0.613* 0.870* 1.002* 0.927* 0.789* 
 (0.096) (0.092) (0.081) (0.103) (0.119) (0.210) (0.126) (0.130) (0.132) (0.141) 
Technician 0.274* 0.320* 0.377* 0.368* 0.470 0.577* 0.795* 0.958* 0.861* 0.868* 
 (0.084) (0.063) (0.055) (0.069) (0.073) (0.125) (0.105) (0.108) (0.117) (0.113) 
Clerk 0.162*** 0.219* 0.231* 0.187* 0.332* 0.095 0.306* 0.422* 0.495* 0.447* 
 (0.087) (0.057) (0.043) (0.039) (0.078) (0.124) (0.096) (0.102) (0.116) (0.108) 
Skilled 0.032 0.030 0.044 0.109* 0.225* -0.050 0.114 0.153** 0.160 0.288** 
 (0.062) (0.046) (0.033) (0.034) (0.060) (0.128) (0.095) (0.091) (0.128) (0.123) 
Agric worker -0.292* -0.281* -0.177* -0.061 -0.017 -0.513** -0.226 -0.062 -0.295 0.055 
 (0.100) (0.082) (0.053) (0.077) (0.082) (0.233) (0.168) (0.127) (0.186) (0.361) 
Artisan 0.087 0.034 -0.004 0.011 0.039 -0.056 0.118 0.147 0.032 -0.004 
 (0.065) (0.037) (0.027) (0.032) (0.052) (0.144) (0.101) (0.091) (0.116) (0.115) 
Elementary Jobs -0.198* -0.184* -0.194* -0.188* -0.148* -0.408* -0.277* -0.242* -0.326* -0.270* 
 (0.054) (0.037) (0.028) (0.031) (0.047) (0.101) (0.088) (0.087) (0.109) (0.080) 
Industries 
Agriculture -0.563* -0.731* -0.806* -0.792* -0.72* -0.183 -0.294* -0.327* -0.433* -0.460* 
 (0.081) (0.057) (0.045) (0.052) (0.074) (0.131) (0.074) (0.075) (0.078) (0.092) 
Mining 0.185** 0.031 -0.070** -0.134* -0.133** 0.083 0.396 0.230 -0.001 0.568 
 (0.080) (0.046) (0.036) (0.043) (0.069) (0.447) (0.241) (0.159) (0.135) (0.390) 
Electricity 0.171 0.278* 0.339* 0.285* 0.382** 0.723* 0.440*** 0.417 0.755** 1.236** 
 (0.155) (0.092) (0.089) (0.111) (0.156) (0.247) (0.236) (0.315) (0.377) (0.549) 
Construction -0.153 -0.195* -0.144* -0.202* -0.178** 0.033 0.166 0.299*** 0.197 -0.092 
 (0.100) (0.056) (0.050) (0.057) (0.074) (0.655) (0.312) (0.161) (0.169) (0.348) 
Trade -0.125 -0.193* -0.229* -0.252* -0.274* -0.178 
-0.141*** -0.122*** 
-0.276* -0.183** 
 (0.085) (0.053) (0.036) (0.040) (0.062) (0.125) (0.078) (0.063) (0.081) (0.084) 
Transport -0.002 0.064 0.058 0.038 0.034 0.352 0.234*** 0.092 -0.051 0.423** 
 (0.134) (0.061) (0.038) (0.050) (0.082) (0.355) (0.140) (0.150) (0.167) (0.169) 
Finance 0.129 -0.004 -0.110** -0.116** -0.154** 0.339* 0.260* 0.229* 0.023 0.213 
 (0.078) (0.064) (0.042) (0.055) (0.078) (0.121) (0.095) (0.078) (0.080) (0.134) 
Social Service 0.056 0.090*** 0.108* 0.079*** 0.040 -0.116 -0.174** -0.179* -0.257* -0.179* 
 (0.075) (0.051) (0.036) (0.046) (0.063) (0.107) (0.071) (0.063) (0.064) (0.071) 
Unionism 0.441* 0.348* 0.266* 0.216* 0.181* 0.525* 0.483* 0.486* 0.534* 0.536* 
 (0.041) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.035) (0.051) (0.040) (0.035) (0.041) (0.048) 
Provinces 
Western Cape 0.104 0.090*** -0.017 -0.032 -0.067 0.306* 0.181* 0.090*** 0.070 0.012 
 (0.086) (0.050) (0.055) (0.052) (0.068) (0.084) (0.055) (0.049) (0.051) (0.068) 
Eastern Cape -0.520* -0.447* -0.386* -0.281* -0.326* -0.780* -0.633* -0.662* -0.580* -0.439* 
 (0.081) (0.070) (0.048) (0.061) (0.070) (0.089) 0(.058) (0.048) (0.055) (0.071) 
Northern Cape -0.217 -0.117 -0.081 -0.018 0.040 -0.477* -0.416* -0.408* -0.399* -0.413* 
 (0.149) (0.115) (0.072) (0.084) (0.133) (0.138) (0.112) (0.083) (0.078) (0.076) 
Free State -0.412* -0.357* -0.355* -0.361* -0.357* -0.888* -0.867* -0.687* -0.541* -0.394* 
 (0.064) (0.048) (0.042) (0.039) (0.063) (0.084) (0.053) (0.060) (0.065) (0.075) 
Kwazulu/Natal -0.140** -0.130* -0.112* -0.103** -0.083 -0.364* -0.328* -0.355* -0.248* -0.168** 
 (0.066) (0.046) (0.041) (0.047) (0.065) (0.078) (0.044) (0.048) (0.052) (0.069) 
North West -0.255* -0.147* -0.154* -0.114* -0.121* -0.348* -0.325* -0.332* -0.239* -0.197* 
 (0.077) (0.049) (0.037) (0.039) (0.048) (0.079) (0.056) (0.050) (0.046) (0.057) 
Mpumalanga -0.220* -0.141* -0.126* -0.123* -0.105*** -0.379* -0.341* -0.350* -0.268* -0.197* 
 (0.076) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.062) (0.080) (0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.074) 
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Northern Province -0.181* -0.233* -0.276* -0.231* -0.205* -0.357* -0.349* -0.388* -0.360* -0.211* 
 (0.080) (0.047) (0.046) (0.059) (0.087) (0.076) 0.050) 0.042) 0.053) 0.077) 
Sample Selection Correction Terms 
lambda1 - - - - - -6.141 -5.225 -7.569** -3.387 1.863 
 - - - - - (6.134) (3.592) (3.697) (5.392) (6.230) 
lambda2 - - - - - 8.253 6.896 9.894** 4.294 -2.295 
 - - - - - (8.258) (4.833) (4.968) (7.103) (8.326) 
lambda3 - - - - - 0.406 0.427 0.671** 0.297 -0.272 
 - - - - - (0.540) (0.327) (0.327) (0.520) (0.579) 
lambda4 - - - - - -0.052 -0.089 -0.153** -0.101 0.019 
 - - - - - (0.097) (0.055) (0.061) (0.098) (0.106) 
Constant 3.301* 4.857* 5.598* 5.930* 5.838* 3.409* 4.384* 5.217* 5.542* 5.052* 
 (0.314) (0.269) (0.195) (0.203) (0.303) (0.685) (0.417) (0.407) (0.559) (0.598) 
Observations 6470 6470 6470 6470 6470 4949 4949 4949 4949 4949 
Bootstrapped Standard errors (200, replications accounting for clustering) in parentheses* significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%* *; ** 
































































Table 2c: Quantile Regressions for African Men and Women’s Log Real Wages (2004) 
 Males Females 
Quantile θ  =10 θ  =25 θ  =50 θ  =75 θ  =90 θ  =10 θ  =25 θ  =50 θ  =75 θ  =90 
Age 0.047* 0.03* 0.032* 0.035* 0.036* 0.026** 0.041* 0.031 0.013 0.018*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Age2 -0.0005* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0004** -0.0003* -0.0003* -7E-05 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log hours 0.362* 0.192* 0.1** 0.028 -0.054 0.432* 0.4* 0.427* 0.337* 0.287* 
 (0.068) (0.044) (0.048) (0.044) (0.071) (0.034) (0.028) (0.030) (0.040) (0.042) 
Married 0.147* 0.117* 0.11* 0.126* 0.178* 0.07*** 0.097* 0.094* 0.126* 0.084* 
 (0.034) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.031) (0.037) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) 
Education levels 
Primary -0.027 0.004 -0.039 -0.074** -0.116** 0.247* 0.176* 0.088** -0.003 0.001 
 (0.054) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.046) (0.072) (0.038) (0.041) (0.034) (0.035) 
Secondary 0.154* 0.178* 0.177* 0.17* 0.178* 0.422* 0.422* 0.251* 0.176* 0.276* 
 (0.059) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.047) (0.065) (0.041) (0.043) (0.038) (0.036) 
Diploma 0.716* 0.769* 0.734* 0.637* 0.675* 0.683* 0.861* 0.684* 0.502* 0.493* 
 (0.094) (0.062) (0.067) (0.056) (0.079) (0.100) (0.082) (0.069) (0.066) (0.063) 
Degree 0.943* 1.01* 1.067* 1.122* 1.104* 0.742* 0.944* 0.611* 0.667* 0.792* 
 (0.173) (0.110) (0.121) (0.130) (0.157) (0.166) (0.123) (0.094) (0.117) (0.124) 
Occupations 
Manager  0.572* 0.771* 0.754* 0.83* 0.955* 0.903* 1.053* 1.453* 1.463* 1.526* 
 (0.139) (0.141) (0.096) (0.082) (0.198) (0.239) (0.157) (0.146) (0.166) (0.159) 
Professional 0.451* 0.416* 0.251** 0.259** 0.563** 0.781* 1.027* 1.239* 1.051* 0.984* 
 (0.173) (0.092) (0.120) (0.124) (0.220) (0.187) (0.136) (0.110) (0.144) (0.144) 
Technician  0.341* 0.252* 0.207* 0.323* 0.504* 0.7* 0.842* 0.957* 0.963* 0.831* 
 (0.077) (0.055) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.139) (0.086) (0.080) (0.102) (0.099) 
Clerk 0.15 0.176* 0.162* 0.37* 0.52* 0.256*** 0.393* 0.65* 0.635* 0.602* 
 (0.092) (0.054) (0.056) (0.061) (0.088) (0.135) (0.083) (0.080) (0.092) (0.090) 
Skilled -0.05 -0.011 -0.047 0.001 0.165* -0.02 0.158*** 0.329* 0.357* 0.353* 
 (0.059) (0.048) (0.040) (0.046) (0.057) (0.127) (0.083) (0.078) (0.102) (0.094) 
Agricwkr -0.052 -0.223* -0.327* -0.334* -0.195* 0.168 0.149 0.04 -0.013 -0.438 
 (0.234) (0.074) (0.077) (0.132) (0.093) (0.549) (0.182) (0.137) (0.325) (0.361) 
Artisan -0.013 0.018 -0.029 0.043 0.093*** -0.167 0.005 0.121*** 0.106 -0.045 
 (0.042) (0.034) (0.031) (0.032) (0.051) (0.147) (0.078) (0.067) (0.096) (0.104) 
Elementary -0.227* -0.194* -0.233* -0.2* -0.15* -0.24** -0.096 -0.095 -0.145*** -0.24* 
 (0.044) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.044) (0.105) (0.070) (0.065) (0.085) (0.085) 
Industries 
Agriculture -0.272* -0.378* -0.504* -0.6* -0.605* 0.016 -0.079 -0.191* -0.313* -0.328* 
 (0.059) (0.040) (0.032) (0.038) (0.064) (0.096) (0.063) (0.048) (0.070) (0.069) 
Mining 0.281* 0.248* 0.201* 0.113** 0.144*** -0.117 0.066 0.044 0.133 1.006* 
 (0.060) (0.040) (0.040) (0.052) (0.074) (0.358) (0.288) (0.245) (0.350) (0.288) 
Electricity 0.202 0.028 0.158** -0.039 -0.099 0.632* 0.683* 0.65* 0.386* 0.452* 
 (0.147) (0.087) (0.061) (0.066) (0.177) (0.250) (0.208) (0.162) (0.164) (0.160) 
Construction -0.121 -0.143* -0.146* -0.188* -0.189* 0.015 0.051 -0.003 0.246 0.278 
 (0.075) (0.053) (0.041) (0.043) (0.074) (0.131) (0.110) (0.083) (0.158) (0.175) 
Trade  -0.255* -0.263* -0.209* -0.198* -0.22* -0.089 -0.179* -0.268* -0.269* -0.213* 
 (0.056) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040) (0.070) (0.107) (0.068) (0.058) (0.073) (0.072) 
Transport -0.008 0.049 0.104*** 0.11** 0.126*** 0.332* 0.252* 0.258* 0.414* 0.649* 
 (0.091) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053) (0.073) (0.127) (0.103) (0.117) (0.127) (0.113) 
Finance -0.055 -0.065 -0.114** -0.083 -0.133*** 0.251*** 0.137*** 0.051 0.092 0.073 
 (0.079) (0.056) (0.048) (0.057) (0.069) (0.131) (0.076) (0.063) (0.077) (0.078) 
Social services -0.075 0.027 0.111** 0.108** 0.087 -0.057 -0.146* -0.162* -0.193* -0.118*** 
 (0.072) (0.049) (0.041) (0.039) (0.062) (0.092) (0.059) (0.044) (0.069) (0.067) 
Unionism 0.513* 0.483* 0.385* 0.344* 0.253* 0.71* 0.654* 0.606* 0.584* 0.603* 
 (0.035) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.034) (0.053) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) 
Provinces 
Western Cape -0.109*** -0.085 -0.131* -0.115* -0.213* 0.164 0.016 -0.034 0.01 0.01 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.037) (0.042) (0.055) (0.115) (0.049) (0.043) (0.051) (0.051) 
Eastern Cape -0.354* -0.293* -0.213* -0.129* -0.152* -0.615* -0.57* -0.507* -0.352* -0.4* 
 (0.073) (0.052) (0.044) (0.043) (0.057) (0.065) (0.046) (0.042) (0.048) (0.042) 
Northern Cape -0.438* -0.289* -0.201* -0.049 0.019 -0.253 -0.281* -0.21* -0.191* -0.262* 
 (0.097) (0.050) (0.052) (0.071) (0.104) (0.178) (0.071) (0.060) (0.069) (0.076) 
Free State -0.427* -0.356* -0.351* -0.328* -0.334* -0.669* -0.583* -0.509* -0.458* -0.514* 
 (0.061) (0.040) (0.034) (0.046) (0.055) (0.072) (0.058) (0.038) (0.046) (0.042) 
KwaZulu/Natal -0.171* -0.114* -0.055 0.038 0.005 -0.333* -0.3* -0.277* -0.266* -0.3* 
 (0.048) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045) (0.055) (0.040) (0.034) (0.037) (0.033) 
North West  -0.193* -0.206* -0.207* -0.183* -0.205* -0.333* -0.323* -0.28* -0.244* -0.287* 
 (0.059) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.060) (0.072) (0.050) (0.046) (0.042) (0.040) 
Mpumalanga -0.309* -0.254* -0.259* -0.167* -0.051 -0.532* -0.433* -0.404* -0.339* -0.296* 
 (0.063) (0.042) (0.037) (0.051) (0.080) (0.084) (0.057) (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) 
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Northern Province -0.315* -0.226* -0.216* -0.149* -0.185* -0.517* -0.545* -0.435* -0.337* -0.311 
 (0.080) (0.042) (0.044) (0.050) (0.056) (0.070) (0.051) (0.040) (0.047) (0.043) 
Sample Selection Correction Terms 
lambda1 - - - - - -3.029 -8.249** 1.175 3.254 0.977 
 - - - - - (3.305) (3.021) (2.125) (2.836) (2.734) 
lambda2 - - - - - 3.897 11.25** -1.349 -4.657 -1.632 
 - - - - - (4.460) (4.047) (2.903) (3.803) (3.676) 
lambda3 - - - - - 0.248 0.73** -0.215 -0.248 0.028 
 - - - - - (0.303) (0.278) (0.186) (0.262) (0.254) 
lambda4 - - - - - 0.044 -0.077*** 0.042 0.033 -0.001 
 - - - - - (0.046) (0.047) (0.028) (0.043) (0.041) 
Constant 3.755* 4.997* 5.733* 6.188* 6.739* 3.756* 4.029* 3.811* 4.863* 5.405* 
 (0.333) (0.225) (0.210) (0.222) (0.379) (0.436) (0.340) (0.283) (0.335) (0.341) 
Observations 5918 5918 5918 5918 5918 5121 5121 5121 5121 5121 
Bootstrapped Standard errors (200, replications accounting for clustering) in parentheses* significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%* *; ** 

































































Table 3: Gender gaps (Observed and Counterfactual) 1995, 1999 and 2004 
  θ  = 10 θ  = 25 θ  = 50 θ  = 75 θ  = 90 
Observed 0.56 0.41 0.36 0.16 0.11 
Counterfactual 0.60 0.46 0.29 0.14 0.17 
1995 % of observed gap due to different returns 107 112 81 88 154 
       
Observed 0.56 0.76 0.55 0.11 0.13 
Counterfactual 0.59 0.69 0.51 0.18 0.15 
1999 % of observed gap due to different returns 105 91 93 164 115 
       
Observed 0.66 0.61 0.60 0.15 0.05 
Counterfactual 0.52 0.44 0.44 0.15 0.13 
2004 % of observed gap due to different returns 79 72 73 100 260 
 
 
